Antarctica and the Law of the Sea:
Rethinking the Current Legal
Dilemmas

CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER*

The contemporary legal status of Antarcticawill soon become a
controversial issue because of its numerous natural resources
presently or potentially exploitable. With discovery of these resources, a complex dispute over legal jurisdictionhas arisen between the original signatory nations to the Antarctic Treaty of
1959 and those non-Treaty States advocating the internationalization of Antarctica.
This Article analyzes the position of the signatoriesthat have
controlled Antarctica, the impending resource controversy, and
the possibility of internationalcontrol. If accomodation between
Treaty and non-Treaty members can be achieved, great progress
will have been made towardglobal harmony under international
law.

INTRODUCTION

Though temperatures as low as -126'F have been recorded
there, Antarctica could soon become one of the world's hot spots
politically. This possibility is attributable to the longstanding dispute over the legal status of that landmass and the validity of various claims made to territory there by certain nations. The twelve
original signatory nations' to the Antarctic Treaty of 19592 have
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1. Initially, the Treaty bound seven Claimant States: Great Britain, New Zealand, Australia, Chile, Argentina, Norway and France. and five Non-Claimant
States: the United States, Soviet Union, Union of South Africa, Japan, and
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managed to skirt the legal issues and focus on scientific research
and exploration. Recent developments have indicated that the
continent, its continental shelf, and outlying waters harbor numerous natural resources, some of which are commercially exploitable at the present time.3 With these discoveries the
problems of legal jurisdiction over the continent and management
of its resources have resurfaced.
The original signatories of the 1959 Treaty are today striving to
maintain control of the Antarctic, and thereby, insure their position to prevent developing nations from sharing in the possible
benefits of resource exploitation. Progressive thinkers have advocated the application of the "common heritage of mankind" concept to this last great frontier of the earth. This paper will assess
the present "regime" that has been in charge of Antarctica, discuss the impending resource controversy, and evaluate the possibility for internationalization of Antarctica during the remainder
of this century.
HistoricalBackground
Antarctica is the highest, windiest, coldest, and most inaccessible of all the earth's continents. The Antarctic area is vast, cold,
inhospitable to man, and almost lifeless: a frigid desert in essence. There are perhaps 200,000 square miles that are ice free,
and in a few isolated valley areas the temperatures in the best
months are comparable to the coldest months in Minneapolis,
Minnesota. The vast bulk of the continent lies under a mantle of
from one to four miles of ice. If this ice blanket were to melt, it
would raise the world's oceans by 200 feet, inundating numerous
4
coastal cities in the process.
Belgium. Since 1959, nine other nations have acceded to the Treaty, including

Czechoslovakia, Denmark, the Netherlands, Poland, Bulgaria, Federal Republic of
Germany, Romania, East Germany and Brazil. 14 Arrc'rc J. oF TH U.S. 12
(1979). The twelve original signatories are known collectively as the "Consultative
Parties," and hold biennial meetings to discuss conservation policies and exchange information about the cold continent. Since the Antarctic Treaty entered
into force in 1961, ten Consultative Meetings have been convened: Canberra in
1961; Buenos Aires, in 1962; Brussels, in 1964; Santiago, in 1966; Paris, in 1968; Tokyo, in 1970; Wellington, in 1972; Oslo, in 1975; London, in 1977; and Washington,
D.C., in 1979. The Eleventh Consultative Meeting is scheduled to be held in Argentina in 1981. Important to note also is that only Poland has been admitted to
Consultative Party status by the original Treaty members.
2. 12 U.S.T. 794, T.LA.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71 (1959).
3. See text at notes 36-55 infra.
4. For relevant discussions of Antarctica's physical features and characteristics, see, The Future ofAntarctica (Earthscan Press Briefing Doc. No. 5), reprinted
in Exploitation of Antarctic Resources; Hearing before the Subcomm. on Arms
Contro; Oceans, and the InternationalEnvironment of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 189 (1978); Taubenfeld, A Treaty for Antarc-
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The continent received attention from explorers as early as the
close of the nineteenth century,5 and by 1940, a number of national claims had been made.6 It was not until the decade following World War 1, however, that many nations expressed serious
interest in the Antarctic. By this time seven governments, Australia,7 New Zealand, 8 United Kingdom, 9 France,' 0 Norway,"
INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION 246 (1961); P. JESSUP & H. TAUBENFELD,
CONTROLS FOR OUTER SPACE AND THE ANTARCTIC ANALOGY 138 (1959); Rubin,
Antarctic Meteorology inFROZEN FUTURES 146, 162 (R. Lewis &P. Smith eds. 1973);

tica, 531

and CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

AGENCY, POLAR REGIONS: ATLAS 50

(1978).

5. Generally insightful accounts of the exploration of Antarctica may be
found in JESSUP &TAUBENFELD, supra note 4, at 139; Deacon, The Southern Ocean:
History and Exploration, in ADAPTATIONS WnrHIN THE ANTARCTIC ECOSYSTEMS:
SCAR SymposSIUI ON ANTARCTIC BIOLOGY xv (G. Llano
ed. 1977), and Gould, Emergence of Antarctica, in FROZEN FUTURES, supra note 4,

PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD

at 11.
6. Although the first "notable historic claim" was made by a Frenchman,
Dumount D'Urville, in 1837, it was not until the twentieth century that formal legal
claims were made by Great Britain (1908), New Zealand (1923), Australia (1933),
France (1938), Norway (1939), Chile (1940), and Argentina (1940). All claims were
predicated primarily upon the principles of discovery and occupation. See notes 731 infra.
7. Australia claimed the area south of 601 South Latitude, between 450 East
and 1600 East, save for the interceding French sector running 1360 East to 1420
East. This claim was activated through a February 7, 1933, Order in Council by the
United Kingdom, reprintedin 46 INT'L L.DoCs 236 (1948-49 Compilation) (Publication of the Naval War College). Australia formalized its claim in the Australian
Antarctic Territory Acceptance Act No. 8 of 1933, located in I ACTS OF THE PARLIAMENT OF THE CoMMoNwEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, 1901-50, at 227 (1951).

8. New Zealand's administrative claim, known as the Ross Dependency, encompasses the area from 1600 East to 150' West and was made possible by a July
30, 1923, Order in Council by the United Kingdom to the Governor of New Zealand.
Reprinted in INT'L L. Docs supra note 7, at 235. For especially enlightening accounts, see generally F. AUBURN, THE Ross DEPENDENCY
QUARTERMAiN, SOUTH FROM NEW ZEALAND (1964).

(1972)

and L.

9. The British claim, which was made in conjunction with the islands comprising the Falkland Islands Dependencies, covered the area between 200 West
and 800 West, below 500 South, and was enunciated in a Letters Patent of July 21,
1908, reprintedin INT'L L.Docs, supra note 7, at 231-33. A subsequent Letters Patent of March 28, 1917, amended the earlier claim to include 200 West to 500 West
below 500 South and in addition, claimed the area from 50° West to 80° West below 500 South. Id., at 233.
10. The French sector, known as Adelie Land, covers the "islands and territories situated south of the 60-degree parallel of south latitude and between the 136degree and 142-degree meridians of longitude east" and was articulated in the
Presidential Decree of April 1, 1938, reprinted in Id., at 230-31. See also 1 G. Hackworth, 1 DIGEST OF INT'L LAW 459 (1940).

11. Norway claimed sovereignty over Bouvet (Bouvetoya) Island on January
23, 1928, and over Peter I Island on May 1, 1931. INT'L L. Docs, supra note 7, at 238,
239. Presumably to obviate the possibility of any German annexation in Antarctica, Norway claimed "[t]hat part of the mainland coast" between 200 West and
450 East (Queen Maud Land) by the Royal Proclamation of January 14, 1939, re-

Chile,12 and Argentina,' 3 had made formal claims. Besides these
self-designated claimant nations, Belgium, Japan, South Africa,
the Soviet Union, and the United States had demonstrated historic interests in the Antarctic and consequently they too expected to be part of any international discussion concerning the
continent's future political status.14 As testimony to the serious
confrontational nature of these claims, a dispute in 1948, which involved exchanges of diplomatic notes and deployment of warships, occurred between Great Britain, Argentina, and Chile. 15
In that same year, the United States State Department, realizing full well the drift toward conflict and duplication of effort, took
the diplomatic initiative and proposed to the countries concerned
that talks on the desirability of a conference should be convened
to discuss possible internationalization of the continent. The reactions of those governments solicited were universally opposed
to any relinquishment of national claims, and the matter was subsequently dropped. At this time, feeling that it had been deliberately excluded from the discussion of an Antarctic settlement, the
Soviet Union expressed its interest in Antarctica, as it proclaimed
that "The Government of the Soviet Union cannot agree that such
a question as the regime for the Antarctic should be decided without their participation."'1 6 This development provoked genuine
concern in the State Department that the Cold War might spread
to the South Pole.
printed in 34 AM. J. INT'L L. 83 (Supp. 1940). Interesting to note, Norway's claim
does not extend seaward from glaciafirma Antarctica, and that even though a
Norwegian, Roald Amunden, was the first explorer to reach the South Pole in 1911,
Norway has made no legal claim to that interior region. JESSUP & TAUBENFELD,
supra note 4, at 152-54.
12. Chile proclaimed its sovereignty over a sector situated 530 West and 900
West in the Presidential Decree of November 6, 1940, reprintedin INr'L L.Docs,
supra note 7, at 224. Not insignificant is the fact that Chile traces its claim back to
the 1493 Papal Bull of Alexander VI which, coupled with the Treaty of Tordesillas
in 1494, divided up the New World between Portugal and Spain. See Zegers, The
Antarctic System and the Utilization of Resources, 33 U. MIAMI L.REV.427, 455-59
(1978).
13. Argentina's claim includes the pie-shaped sector between 25* West and 74'
West, bordered on the north by the 60th parallel of south latitude. While never
officially issuing a formal claims document, Argentina did publish Decree-Law No.
2191 of February 28, 1957, in its Boletin Oficial (March 19, 1957), whereby it reestablished the National Territory of Tierra del Fuego, the Antarctic and the Islands
of the South Atlantic. 9 POLAR RECORDS 52-53 (1958). Significantly, similar to
Chile, Argentina's claim to Antarctica is based on rights purportedly inherited
from Spain through the doctrine of uti possidetis. For an evaluation, see Hayton,
The "American"Antarctic,50 Am. J. INT'L L. 583, 603 (1956). Certainly, also not unimportant is the realization that both Argentina's and Chile's claims overlap substantially with the claim of the United Kingdom.
14. 52 Am. Soc'Y INr'L L PROCEEDINGS 161-63 (1958). (Summary of Post-IGY
National Plans).
15. Whiteman, 2 DIGEST OF INT'L LAW 1238 (1963).
16. Hanessian, The Antarctic Treaty, 1959, 9 INT'L & CoMiP. LQ. 446 (1960).
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Further attempts by the United States during the early 1950s in
arranging a multilateral conference to grapple with the status of
Antarctica were largely unsuccessful. These efforts were overshadowed by international military conflicts such as those in Korea and the Middle East. The principal stimulus for stepped-up
diplomatic activity concerning Antarctica came with the preparation for, and conduct of, the International Geophysical Year
(IGY), held from July 1957 to December 1958. Technically a cooperative, non-governmental effort on the part of various national
members of the International Council of Scientific Unions
(ICSU), the IGY was particularly significant for the magnitude
and scope of the projects scheduled for completion by the end of
1958.17 Consequently as the IGY proceeded, scientific groups
from several nations established research stations and conducted
expeditions in Antarctica, guided by a tacit agreement neither to
make new claims in the area nor to recognize formally any existing claims of other participants.
In April 1958, the Department of State announced that it was
undertaking diplomatic conversations with interested nations
concerning an extension of multi-national scientific cooperation
beyond the IGY, although it should be mentioned that the ICSU
already had created in September 1957, a Special Committee on
Antarctic Research to help direct post-IGY work.18 In any event,
President Eisenhower in May 1958 wrote to eleven other nations
engaged in IGY Antarctic activities. He proposed holding a multilateral conference in order to prevent Antarctica's becoming "an
object of political conflict," as well as to insure the area's being
kept open to all nations to conduct "scientific or other peaceful activities" there under "joint administrative arrangements." The
letter stipulated that the legal status quo would be frozen, thus
permitting cooperation in scientific and administrative matters
without being hamstrung by political considerations. Hence, the
idea of a permanent legal solution to the question of sovereignty
in Antarctica was abandoned.' 9 Nevertheless, on October 15, 1959,
the Antarctic Treaty Conference was convened in Washington,
and after six weeks of intensive negotiations, the final act and
17. In actuality, the issue of the Polar regions was a major impetus for the
IGY. Hayton, The Antarctic Settlement of 1959, 54 ALI. J. INT'L L. 353-54 (1960).
18. Hayton, Polar Problems and InternationalLaw, 52 ALM. J. INT'L L. 755

(1958).
19. Taubenfeld, supra note 4, at 280.

completed Treaty were both signed on December 1, 1959.20
The Antarctic Treaty and its Resultant Legal Implications
Since numerous aspects of the Treaty will be treated throughout the course of this paper, it is prudent here to outline some of
its major provisions. Article I of the Treaty demilitarizes the continent. Under Article III the twelve signatories agree to promote
international cooperation in scientific investigation in Antarctica,
including the sharing of research data. Article IV effectively
freezes the question of the validity of territorial claims in the
Antarctic. It also asserts that "no acts or activities taking place
while the Treaty is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting,
supporting, or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica." Article V specifically prohibits nuclear explosions and the
disposal of radioactive wastes on the continent. Furthermore,
under the Treaty's formula for inspection, each contracting party
is entitled to "designate observers to carry out" inspections.
These observers "shall have complete freedom of access at anytime to any or all areas of Antarctica," including research stations. Finally, participating States are committed to giving
advance notice to all contracting parties of all expeditions and of
all stations occupied.2 1
Critics of the Treaty regime have often pointed to the exclusive
nature of the Antarctic "club." Antarctic policy is substantively
decided by consultative meetings of representatives from the
twelve original contracting parties. The recommendations produced by the meetings must be acceptable to all representatives
present and recommendations can only become operative when
ratified by all the original signatories' respective legislatures. 22
The point to be underscored here, however, is that according to
Article IX of the 1959 Treaty, only those States with scientific stations on the continent may become a party to the Consultative
structure. As a consequence, developing countries, who have insufficient funds to meet basic domestic needs, cannot afford to divert precious resources for establishing scientific stations on
Antarctica. These States, therefore, are likely to be barred indefinitely from shaping decisions that could positively affect their
20. For a detailed prehistory of the Treaty, see Hanessian, supra note 16, at
436-44. The Conference proceedings are contained in THE CONFERENCE ON ANTARCT CA (U.S. Dept. of State Publication No. 7060) (1959).
21. A discussion of the Treaty provisions is found in The Antarctic Treaty
Hearingsbefore the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 et
seq. (1960).
22. Accord art.XII of the Antarctic Treaty, supra note 2.
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welfares and economies. 23 The upshot of the situation is that the
Consultative Parties have legally enscounced themselves as sole
protectors and overseers of the Antarctic region, and have
granted to themselves under Article X the presumptuous right
and authority to determine which activities may or may not be
conducted in the area.24
Highly demonstrative of the exclusive nature of the Antarctic
club is the fact that since 1959, only one other nation, Poland, has
gained formal admittance. The Federal Republic of Germany, a
candidate for full membership, has undertaken establishment of
an Antarctic research station and program at an estimated cost of
$100 million.25 This illustrates the magnitude of the expenses in-

volved and demonstrates why the costs of seeking to join the Consultative elite are prohibitive for Third World nations.
Undoubtedly this situation does not trouble the Consultative Parties, all of whom would certainly like to retain the southern continent's affairs strictly under their purview.
Indeed, the reaction of the Consultative Parties to external initiatives generally has been negative, and at times even hostile.
For example, in 1975, the Parties thwarted an attempted encroachment upon their authority by the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP). Item IV-F of the UNEP's Proposed
Program on February 11, 1975, sought to extend the Treaty "with
special attention being given to ensuring that full and adequate
provision is made for protection of the environment, particularly
in relation to the possible exploitation of the natural resources of
the Antarctic region." The strategy involved initiating preliminary consultations between the Treaty powers and "other concerned Governments," as well as establishing an expert body "to
draw up proposed guidelines for exploration and exploitation" of
Antarctica, and convening legal experts to propose additional
Treaty articles. Not surprisingly, the Consultative Parties who at23. See the arguments made in Note, Thaw in InternationalLaw? Rights in
Antarctica under the Law of Common Spaces, 87 YALE UJ. 324 (1978). Cf. Note,
The Polar Regions and the Law of the Sea, 8 CASE W.J. OF INT'L U 204, 215-17

(1976).
24. Article X of the Antarctic Treaty provides that, "Each of the Contracting
Parties undertakes to exert appropriate efforts, consistent with the Charter of the
United Nations, to the end that no one engages in any activity in Antarctica contrary to the principles or purposes of the present Treaty." The Antarctic Treaty,
supra note 2, at art. Y
25. Mitchell & Kimball, Conflict Over the Cold Continent, 35 FOREIGN PoucY
132 (1979).

tended the UNEP Governing Council meeting were instrumental
in blocking any consideration or decision of the matter by
UNEP.26 A year later, the FAO made a joint proposal with the
U.N. Development Program (.UNDP) for a forty-five million dollar,
ten-year program, one of whose goals was the rational utilization
of the living resources of the area for the benefit of the world as a
whole and the developing countries in particular. The Consultative Parties managed to dissuade both the UNEP and the U.N. Economic and Social Council from taking up the matter and were
partly responsible for withdrawal of the original FAO-UNDP proposal in favor of a $200,000 Southern Oceans Fisheries Survey
Program.2 7
Since the pivotal players in the Antarctic region are still the
Consultative Parties, it is useful to analyze them as a group in order to appreciate pertinent information about their claims and
disparate priorities. The claims of Argentina, Britain, and Chile
to the partially ice-free Palmer Peninsula, an area seemingly most
accessible to mineral exploitation, conflict and overlap in substantial part. The other five claimant States do recognize each other's
claims to some unspecified extent, though Japan, the Soviet
Union, and the United States historically have not legally acknowledged Antarctic claims by any State. 28 Each of the latter
has reserved all rights accruing through efforts made on its behalf, while at the same time each has refused to make any formal
claims to sovereignty.
The legal bases for variant claims of territorial sovereignty in
the Antarctic have been based either on a combination of discovery, exploration, and occupation; 29 or on performance of certain
administrative acts; or on the related principles of continuity, contiguity, and the sector theory.3 0 Not surprisingly, claimant States
26. G. Wilson, Antarctica, the Southern Ocean, and the Law of the Sea 24-25 &

n.47 (April 1, 1976) (unpublished thesis in Harvard Law School Library).
27. Mitchell & Kimball, supra note 25, at 133; Butler, Owning Antarctica Cooperation and Jurisdictionat the South Pole, 31 J. INT'L AFF. 35, 48-49 (1977).
28. Hambro, Some Notes on the Future of the Antarctic Treaty Collaboration,
68 AM. J. INT'L L. 219 (1974).
29. These theories of sovereignty are voiced primarily by Australia, Great
Britain, Norway and France to support their respective claims in Antarctica. However, not only are claims of "first discovery" disputed among the claimant States,
but also the inability to demonstrate permanent and continuous occupation further undercuts their legal validity. For insightful treatments, see Auburn, The
White Desert, 19 INT'L & ComP. L.Q. 229, 234 (1970); Bernhardt, Sovereignty in Antarctica, 5 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 297, 330-31 (1975); Hayton, supra note 13, at 602;
DAIEL, CONFLICT OF SOVREIMGrrriES iN THE ANrTRcric (1949). Y.B. WORLD A"'.
241, 251 (1949); J. KISH, THE LAW OF ILTERNATIONAL SPACES 53, 73-75 (1973); and

Reeves, George V Land, 28 Am. J. INT'L L 117, 118-19 (1934).
30. Because of their non-permanent nature, the continuity of the Antarctic
claims is open to serious question. Goldie, InternationalRelations in Antarctica,
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have invoked the sector principle to define the limits of their
claims in differing ways. Unlike the geographical situation in the
Arctic, however, no nation's territory on another continent
projects below the sixtieth parallel into the Antarctic region
proper. Further, as one expert has pointed out, the sector theory
involves "an arc which is produced extending from the South Pole
embracing between its longitudinal lines the full areas within
which discoveries or explorations or takings of possession have
been made in behalf of the claimant state."3 ' In practice the sector principle really has been used as an aid in defining the extent
of claims based on discovery, contiguity or some other traditional
basis.
Some writers have opined that exclusive territorial claims in
Antarctica are untenable and generally cite three main reasons in
substantiation. First, the claims violate the historical pattern of
international practice and agreement in Antarctica. Second, they
rely upon inadequate application of various doctrines of international law, and finally they rely on outmoded assumptions derived
from the colonial era. These critics point to the history of cooperation among States in exploring and establishing stations and exchanging information. They also stress that there is no effective
understanding that certain regions of the continent are reserved
for exploration, settlement, and investigation by parties of particular nationalities. Instead, the wide dispersion of settlements and
scientific activity demonstrates that the continent is a shared in32
ternational territory.
Presumably, each theory used to defend territorial claims is undercut by an unclear and unconvincing foundation. Thus, there is
no legally acceptable basis for reversing the historical trend. toAusTRuiAN Q., March 1958, at 12-13; Note, Quick, Before It Melts: Toward a Resolution of the JurisdictionalMorass in Antarctica, 10 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 173, 186-87
(1976). Argentina, Chile and Australia claim special consideration due to their rel-

ative proximity to Antarctica. This theory is equally discounted in international
law owing to its vague and amorphous application. Bernhardt, supra note 29, at
332; Hayton, supra note 13, at 604; and AuBuRN, supra note 8, at 249-52. Finally, the
sector "theory," whereby longitudinal lines are drawn from the outermost ends of
the mainland claims to converge on the South Pole, is not actually a valid principle of law, but is merely a technique for cutting up the continent. See Thaw in InternationalLaw?, supra note 23, at 823; Svarlien, The Sector Principlein Law and
Practice,10 Polar Record 248, 260 (1960); and G. SaEDAL, ACQUISITION OVER POLAR
REGIONS, 58 (1931).
31. Wilson, Antarctica, The Southern Ocean, and the Law of the Sea, 30 JUDGE
ADVOcATE GENERAL OF THE NAVY (JAG) 54 (1978).
32. See the sources cited in notes 29 and 30 supra.

ward affirmation of "common rights" in Antarctica. While it has
already been posited that the Treaty extends no form of positive
recognition to claims of territorial sovereignty in Antarctica, it
should also be noted that contemporary international law would
not likely recognize the validity of these claims even if they were
to be tested. This point deserves further elaboration.
Underlying the legal validity of territorial claims is the much
broader question of whether the Antarctic is to be classified as
terra nullius, (territory which is not under the jurisdiction of a
State and, therefore, is subject to appropriation), or as res communis, (things common to all can never be under the sovereignty
of any State and which, consequently, are not subject to national
appropriation). If the Antarctic area is deemed to be terra nullius, then, disregarding the Treaty for a moment, the Antarctic
continent indeed would be subject to appropriation. The claims
of Argentina, Chile, and the other claimants would thereby gain
legal credence, and other States could lay claims to the yet unacquired portion of the continent. To be sure, under terra nullius,
States such as the United States and Soviet Union, which have repeatedly declined to recognize claims in the area, could be expected to compete for positions on the continent. So too, the
competing, overlapping claims of Argentina, Chile, and the U.K.
which caused a good deal of friction in 1949, 1953, and 1956 would
probably reemerge.3 3 Thus, the potential for conflict in Antarctica
under a legal regime of terranullius is both apparent and real, as
it was prior to 1959.
On the other hand, if the Antarctic area is terra nullius and
thus the Treaty does apply, it is evident that only those States
which are parties to the Treaty would be bound to its provisions.
Since under the terms of the Treaty no "State" per se exists on
the continent, the idea of a "coastal State" from which emanates
territorial seas, economic zones, and continental shelves is, at
least, one of uncertain applicability. At present, only Argentina
and Chile have proclaimed 200-mile maritime zones off their
claimed sectors, but other claimants may follow suit.34
Perhaps of even greater significance, there are no legal obstacles to prevent any non-Treaty State from entering the area for
purposes of commercial exploration. New claims to offshore areas
33. WrrEMAN, supra note 15, at 1238-39.
34. Mitchell, Antarctica Riches-For Whom?, FoRUM, August 1977, at 76. These

claims, however, are nebulous and are neither formally defined nor officially administered. For an extensive analysis of the legal implications which 200-mile
maritime zones might pose for Antarctica, see Joyner, The Exclusive Economic
Zone and Antarctica: What Icy Prospectsfor Creeping Jurisdiction?, 21 VA. J.
INT'L L. (1981) (forthcoming).
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could be established unilaterally. Unregulated fishing and unchecked exploitation of mineral resources by non-parties, or a
consortium of non-parties to the Treaty, could be the trend of the
future. 35 Indeed, the potential for a free-for-all land grab in Antarctica looms as a frightful possibility, given the fragile nature of
the Antarctic ecosystem and the devastating impact large-scale
pollution would have upon it.
If one considers the Antarctic not as terra nullius, but rather as
res communis, quite a different situation becomes apparent. The
notion that a dry land area can exist as terra communis would be
a novel development in international law. In this context it is interesting to recall that the Preamble of the Treaty avers that "it is
in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes ...

."

Hence,

the Treaty itself acknowledges that all mankind has a stake in the
future of the area. Moreover, if considered as terra communis, the
Antarctic area would not be subject to appropriation by States because the entire area would, by definition, lie beyond the limits of
national sovereignty and jurisdiction. Such an approach echoes
the "common heritage of mankind" principle being applied in negotiating the future nature of an ocean regime, particularly regarding the deep seabed. By comparison, the Antarctic region
would become tantamount to the "Area" defined in Article I of the
Informal Composite Negotiating Text of the Third United Nations
Conference on Law of the Sea, (ICNT), and thus the Antarctic
area and its resources could be considered another facet of the
common heritage of mankind.
Why all the rancour, one might query, over this cold, desolate,
barren part of the world, a region which Captain James Cook believed in 1772 as offering no benefits for mankind? The answer is
couched in the years of scientific exploration and investigation of
the continent and its surrounding waters which have produced
substantial evidence indicating the existence of numerous available natural resources. Consequently, confronted with impending
global resource scarcities, many nations have begun to eye greedfly Antarctica's resources, especially fish, oil, fresh water, and
hard minerals.
At present, however, the resource receiving the most attention
is the shrimp-like krill (Euphasia superba), which is the back35. Wilson, supra note 31, at 57.

bone of the Antarctic ecosystem. 36 The possible annual harvest of
krill has been estimated to be between 70 to 150 million tons,
though such a wide range admittedly suggests that the experts
have not decided upon the amount that could be safely harvested
without damaging the overall krill stock, as well as the other
forms of marine life that depend directly upon krill.37 Neverthe-

less, when one realizes that the total world marine fish catch is
approximately 60 to 70 million tons annually, the potential contribution that krill would make to a hungry world can hardly be ignored.3 8 It should be noted that there are significant
considerations that argue both for and against the exploitation of
krill. On the positive side, krill retains extremely high protein
content and has a broad range of potential uses. On the negative
side, krill remains the primary food source for higher Antarctic
life forms and thus will be an important food source for other harvestable species such as crabs, squid, and cod. Unregulated harvesting of the krill population, therefore, could have a serious
adverse impact upon essentially all indigenous Antarctic life
forms.

39

Despite krill's attractivity due to its enriched protein content
and ease of harvest, until recently, two obstacles have discouraged acceptance of a viable world krill industry. Krill spoil rapidly, so special primary processing facilities had to be devised on
board factory ships.4O Further, marketing this little known food
resource also had proved to be quite difficult in many of the countries in which it was introduced. Today, however, krill is used in a
wide variety of meal, paste, and minced flesh products, and techniques to produce whole peeled krill are anticipated to be avail36. McWethy, Heating Up: Global Race for Antarctica'sRiches, 82 U.S. NEWS
REPORT, Feb. 28, 1977, at 65. For authoritative treatments, see generally
K. GREEN, ROLE OF KRILL IN THE ANTARCTIC ECOSYSTEM (1977) (U.S. Dept. of State

& WORLD

Contract No. 1722-720248) and TETRA TECH, INC., THE ANTARCTIC KEILL RE-

PROSPECTS FOR COMMERCIAL EXPLOITATION (1978) (U.S. Dept. of State
Contract No. 1722-720188); Antarctic Living MarineResources Negotiations: Hearings Before the National Ocean Policy Study of the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); Scully, The Marine Living Resources of the Southern Ocean, 33 U. Mum L. REV. 341 (1978).
37. See generally El-Sayed, Living Resources of the Southern Ocean, 9
ANTARCTIC J. OF THE U.S. 8 (1976); Laws, The Significance of Vertibrates in the
Antarctic Marine Ecosystem, ANTARCTIC EcosYsTEMs, supra note 5, at 426; Llano,
Ecology of the Southern Ocean Region, 33 U. MIAw L REV. 357 (1978); Scully,
supra note 36, at 345 et seq..
38. 43 FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE U=rED NATIONS, 1976
YEARBOOK OF FISHERY STATISTICS 1 (1977). This includes fish, crustacians, molluscans and other aquatic animals, save for whales.
39. Exploitation of Antarctic Resources: Hearing,supra note 4, at 51.
SOURCES:

40. G. GRANTHA,

THE UTIZATION OF KRIL 18-19 (1977) UNDP/FAO South-

ern Ocean Fisheries Survey Programme, Doc. No. GLO/SO/77/3; The Future of
Antarctica,supra note 5, at 209.
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able in the near future. In addition, technological innovations in
harvesting equipment have greatly enhanced catch rates over the
past decade.
The krill market has become even more attractive with the exclusion of several countries from traditional fisheries by the
worldwide extension of 200-mile exclusive economic zones. In
1974, Russia "experimentally" harvested 20,000 tons of krill, and
Japan reported a 650-ton catch. In 1976, both the Federal Republic
of Germany and Poland sent fishing vessels to the area. In the
following year, the largest krill expedition yet to ply Antarctic waters arrived under the Polish banner. 41 Not unexpectedly, according to the United Nation's Food and Agriculture Organization, the
krill harvest soared to 122,000 tons during the five-month 1977-78
season, and recent indicators suggest that the krill catch will continue to rise, as international competition for fisheries intensifies.
Given this likelihood, many experts remain very concerned about
the overfishing of krill. The recent demise of the Peruvian anchovy industry illustrates how a new fishery can be overexploited
to the point of extinction. 42
Though krill continue in the limelight, aquacultural techniques
also exist for harvesting and processing many other regional
cephalopod and fish species.4 3 In fact, there are early indications
that some Antarctic fishing nations may already be shifting their
economic focus from krill to fin fish. The latter resource evidently
is able to sustain a fishery of a million tons, and apparently Poland, East Germany, and the Soviet Union are rapidly increasing
their fin fish catch; nearly 300,000 tons were reportedly caught in
Antarctic waters by these nations in 1977. Other countries, such
as West Germany, Japan, and Argentina, are also thought to be
seriously evaluating the possibility of exploiting Antarctic fish.44
The exciting prospects for krill exploitation seem matched by
the estimated resource potential of the Antarctic continental shelf
deposits of oil and gas. Three separate factors have engendered
this belief. First, plate tectonic geologists have theorized that
Antarctica formerly was joined to parts of Australia and South
41.
42.
43.
44.

Mitchell & Kimball, supra note 25, at 127-28.
Exploitationof Antarctic Resources: Hearings,supra note 4, at 34.
See the sources cited in note 37 supra.
Mitchell & Kimball, supra note 25, at 132. See also Prepared Statement of

Robert E. Stein, Director North America Office, International Institute for Environment and Development, reprinted in Exploitation of Antarctic Resources:
Hearings,supra note 4, at 60.

America, continents where oil fields have recently been discovered. Second, sections of Antarctica's continental shelf reveal
that thick layers of unmetamorphosed tertiary sediments are evident, a condition which frequently is associated with oil and gas.
Third, ethane and methane, both of which indicate evidence of
hydrocarbon potential, were found in three of four holes drilled
by the Glomar Challenger in the Ross Sea in 1972-1973. 4 5
A recent United States Government report has pinpointed at
least five areas of Antarctica's deep continental shelf from which
it is believed "tens of billions" of barrels of oil could be recovered.
A comparison made with Lake Maracaibo in Venezuela suggests
that the Weddell Sea alone may yield more than 15 billion barrels. 46 In addition, estimates by the U.S. Geological Survey have

predicted that the Western Antarctic continental shelf might contain as much as forty five billion barrels of in-place oil and 115 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. 47 These are significant figures when
compared with similar estimates for the Atlantic and for all offshore Alaska, but it should be made clear that commercial quantities of Antarctic oil and gas have yet to be proved or discovered.
Nevertheless, in 1970, Texaco made inquiries about how to obtain
licenses for oil exploration on the Antarctic continental shelf, and
today, three United States oil companies are represented on the
United States Antarctic Advisory Committee.48
While oil companies may be optimistic about the long-run possibility of extracting petroleum from the Antarctic continental
shelf, environmentalists have voiced serious reservations about
the resultant ecological impacts. In the first place, the long-term
effects of oil spills are unknown. There is little question that sublethal damage to krill from oil could inflict very heavy direct economic losses, notwithstanding possible harm to animals higher in
the food chain: Fur seals' insulation would be affected, as would
birds' feathers; benthic communities (i.e., the bottom-dwellers)
would suffer from heavy hydrocarbons sinking to the ocean floor.
45. McIver, Hydrocarbon Gases in Canned Core Samples from Leg 28, Sites
271, 272, and 273, in INrrITI

REPORTS OF THE DEEP SEA DRILLING PROJECTS 815

(1975). See generally Auburn, Offshore Oiland Gas in Antarctica, 22 GERMAN Y.B.
INT'L L. 139 (1977) and Brand, Natural Gas Deposits in Antarctic Waters Indicated

by Search, N.Y. Times, March 23, 1973, at 1, col 6.
46. Deuser, Lake Maracaiboand Weddell Sea: Comparisonin Petroleum Geology, 55 Am. Assoc. OF PETOLEuAt GEOLOGISTS BULL., 705, 708 (1971).
47. Spivak, Frozen Assets?, Wall St. J., Feb. 21, 1974, at 1, coL 1. See also U.S.
Antarctic Policy: U.S. Policy with Respect to Mineral Exploration and Exploitation in the Antarctic: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Oceans and International
Environment of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 34
(1975).
48. Atlantic Richfield, Gulf, and Exxon. Mitchell & Kimball, supra note 25, at
130.
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The adverse impact on marine life could be protracted due to the
slow rate of microbial degradation of oil at low temperatures. 49
The likelihood of ecological damage from oil exploitation in Antarctica is considerably greater than in temperate regions. No attempt previously has been made to exploit hydrocarbons in areas
where heavy sea ice and icebergs, with their disparate, unpredictable movements, are found floating in combination. Large icebergs, which can project as deep as 250 meters below the surface,
could ram submarine wellheads, while obvious navigational
hazards increase the probability of oil spills from tankers.5 0 Even
small ice formations will prove costly to deflect from colliding
with drilling rigs. .The only proven means of dealing with an approaching iceberg has been to remove the drilling rig from its
path. In short, current conventional platforms would neither be
suitable nor safe in the Antarctic seas. Finally, considering that
there is little or no transportation and commerce to the cold continent in winter, a blowout at the end of the Antarctic summer
might gush uncontrolled for perhaps as long as seven months, until a relief well could be drilled.5'
Just as speculation about potential petroleum reserves on its
continental shelf hinges on the Gondwanaland hypothesis, so too
does much theorizing about mineral resources of Antarctica.
While no uranium has yet been found, in the Norwegian, Australian, and French sectors rocks have been discovered which are
comparable in age and type to those in which uranium occurs in
Australia.52 In addition, the Lassiter Coast on the Antarctic
Peninsula has yielded evidence of porphyry copper similar to that
found in the Andes. The rare basic layered intrusion found on the
Dufek Intrusive is suspected of containing chromium, platinum
49. Auburn, Legal Implications of Petroleum Resources on the Antarctic Continental Shelf, in 1 OCEAN YEARBOOK 510 (E.I. Borgese & M. Ginsburg eds. 1978).
50. Mitchell, Antarctica: A Special Case? 73 NEW SCIENTIST, Jan. 13, 1977, at
64. Dugger, Exploiting Antarctic Mineral Resources-Technology,Economics, and
the Environment, 33 U. MIAIiL REV. 315, 332 (1978).
51. Auburn, supra note 49, at 511; Institute of Polar Studies, A Framework for

Assessing Environmental Impacts of Possible Antarctic Mineral Development vii.
26 (PI. 1977).

52. The Future of Antarctica,supra note 4, at 205. Supporting this hypothesis
is the theory of continental drift which posits that Antarctica was once part of a
giant continent ("Gondwanaland") which was joined together with Australia,

South America, and Africa. See Craddock, Antarctic Geology and Gondwanaland
in FROZEN FuTurmE, supra note 4, at 101 and Mineral Resources of Antarctica 39
(U.S. Geological Survey Circular 705, N. Wright and P. Williams eds., 1974).

and other industrially valuable metals. The Dufek Intrusive is geologically similar to one of South Africa's richest regions, the
Bush Veld. Researchers have further concluded that West Antarctica is similar to the mineral-rich mountain chains of the Andes and Rocky Mountains. 53 Also, deposits of Antarctic coal have
been known since the early Polar expeditions, though they are
highly inaccessible and of relatively poor quality. Finally, potentially mineable iron ore has been found in precambrian rocks in
East Antarctica and in the Prince Charles Mountains. Soviet explorers have discovered what American geologists have described
as a "mountain of iron." While the deposit could be sufficient to
meet present world consumption demands for 200 years, it is unlikely to be developed until more easily recoverable deposits else54
where have been exhausted.
Before turning to the issue of whether anyone has the legal
right to exploit Antarctica's resource wealth, mention should be
made of icebergs which are another prospective resource of the
region. It is important to note that ninety-nine percent of all the
world's fresh water is locked up in the form of ice and that ninety
percent of that ice is found in Antarctica. 55 The potential magnitude of annual Antarctic iceberg production is impressive. Exploiting just ten percent of this resource could supply enough
fresh water each year for irrigating some fifteen to twenty-five
million acres of land.5 6 Several schemes have been proposed for

towing icebergs northward from the Antarctic, but none at present appear economically feasible. The Antarctic region holds
great promise for the future management of the planet's hydrological budget, providing the technical and other problems can be
57
surmounted.
The salient legal question has become: who is to have jurisdiction over, and thereby profit from, Antarctica's natural resource
potential? There is no substantive reference in the Antarctic
Treaty to resources, either living or mineral, and the Treaty establishes neither rules nor mechanisms for allocating rights to ex53. Shapely, Antarctica. World Hungerfor Oil, 184 SCIENCE, May 17, 1974, at
777.
54. The Future of Antarctica supra note 4, at 206. See generally Craddock,
Antarctic Geology and Mineral Resources, in A FRAMEwoRK FOR ASSESSING ENvIRONMENTAL IMPACTS ON POSSIBLE ANTARCTIC MINERAL DEVELOPMENT (D. Elliot ed.,

1977).
55. Fleischmann, The Antarctic Ocean-Empty, but International,29 IMPACT
OF SCIENCE ON SOCIETY 180 (1979).
56. Lundquist, The Iceberg Cometh? InternationalLaw Relating to Iceberg Ex-

ploitation, 17 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 2 (1977); Weeks & Campbell, Icebergs as a
Fresh Water Source: An Appraisal, 12 J. OF GLACIOLOGY 207 (1973).
57. See generally INSTITUTE ON MAN AND SCIENCE, TRANSPORTING ICEBERGS AS

A FRESH WATER SOURCE (1974); Weeks & Campbell, supra note 56, at 210.
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ploit or to control exploration and exploitation of resources,
whether on the continent or offshore. 58 Not surprisingly, there
are deep divisions among Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties as
to whether exploitation of oil, land-based minerals, and other resources should take place. For example, the Soviet Union and Japan are opposed to mineral exploitation, 59 while the United States
has indicated it could support this activity.60 With regard to krill,
the Treaty Parties favor free access, along with sharing catch statistics and negotiating an agreement to regulate the rate of catches. 61
In general, claimant States maintain that they own the resources in their sectors, while nonclaimants argue that freedom of
access exists to the resources of the continent, much the same
way that freedom of access is available to the entire continent for
purposes of scientific research under the Treaty. The United
States is the most vigorous proponent of this so-called "opendoor" policy. This position is strongly contested by the Latin
American claimant States and Australia. In fact, Ambassador
Keith Brennan of Australia made clear at a press briefing in September 1979 that any oil found off the Australian sector would be
regarded as Australian. However, other claimant States, namely
New Zealand and Norway, have been more amenable to compro62
mise.
Looking at the entire issue of resource jurisdiction from the
standpoint of international law, one can say that the legitimacy of
claims to resources of the Antarctic continental margin and to ad58. Barnes, The Emerging Antarctic Living Resources Regime, 73 Am. Soc'y
INT'L L. PROCEEDINGS 284 (1979) and Pallone, Resource Exploitation: The Threat to
the Legal Regime of Antarctica, 10 CoNN. L. REV. 401, 404-08 (1978).
59. Both Japan and the Soviet Union have qualified their opposition to mineral
exploitation by advocating that adequate environmental safeguards should be established before any exploitation begins. Mitchell, Resources in Antarctica Potentialfor Conflict, MAmnE PomicY 98 (1977).
60. United States Antarctic Policy: Hearing Before the Senate Subcomm. on
Oceans and Int7 Environment of the Comm. on ForeignRel., 94th Cong. 1st Sess. 5
(1975); Alexander, A Recommended Approach to the Antarctic Resource Problem,
33 U. MIAMu L. REV. 371, 407 (1978).
61. The Future of Antarctica, supra note 4, at 220. Important to note, in May
1980, the Consultative Parties concluded among themselves a Convention on the
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, which established a Commission and Scientific Committee, as well as an Executive Secretariat, to facilitate
conservation of price resources in the region. Text reprintedin 19 INT'L L. MATERIALS 841 (1980).
62. Mitchell, The Politics of Antarctica, 22 ENvmoliENT 16 (1980).

jacent icebergs turns on two fundamental questions: what is the
legal character of political regimes which now exist or might later
exist on the Antarctic continent proper, and what is the reach of
such political regimes' jurisdiction over the Antarctic continent
and adjacent continental margin? As concluded earlier, no nation
can clearly establish the legitimacy of its Antarctic claim under
existing international law. This factor looms significantly in precluding the determination of natural resource jurisdiction for the
whole region, including its outlying areas.
If the continental shelf is taken as an example, under the 1958
Convention on the Continental Shelf,3 the "coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of
exploring and exploiting its natural resources."6 4 Yet, exactly
what legal nuances pertain to a physical continental shelf given
the absence of a coastal State remains a murky issue. That "no
one" may lay claim to or exploit the resources of the continental
shelf "without the express consent of the coastal State" obviously
provokes much uncertainty for the Antarctic area. This is particularly true because in the legal absence of any recognized "coastal
States" on the Antarctic continent, no one may claim the right to
explore or exploit the continental shelf protruding out from the
landmass. These legal arguments tend to lend credence to the notion that Antarctica should be regarded as terra communis 65 (although, should Antarctica's status come to be held as terranullis,
the spector of an international grab for resources appears quite
real and appalling and hardly beyond the realm of near term possibility).
Given the increasing attention paid to exploitation of Antarctic
resources by several Consultative Parties, strong reasons exist for
expeditiously devising and constructing an effective conservation
regime before large-scale fishing and other commercially vested
interests arrive. To this end, a conservation regime must provide
a responsive and effective system for ensuring that any harvesting of Antarctic marine living resources is performed in accordance with sound conservation principles and established
practices. Some efforts have been made along this line. The
Antarctic Treaty Group's attempt to resolve the sensitive re63. 15 U.S.T. 471, T.LA.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (1958), reprinted in 52 Am. J.
INT'L L 858 (1958).

64. Id., at art. 2.

65. As yet, no state has asserted officially that Antarctica is terra communis,

although a precedent does exist in the case of Spitzbergen Island. Spitzbergen

Treaty, February 9, 1920, 2 L.N.T.S. 8. See Bernhardt, Spitzbergen" Jurisdictional
Frictionover Unexploited Oil Reserves, 4 CAI.. W. INT'L L.J. 61 (1973); Cf. Honnold,
Draft Provisionsof a New InternationalConvention on Antarctica, 4 YALE STuD.
m WORLD PuB. ORD. 123 (1977).
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source issue actually began in 1972 at the Seventh Consultative
Meeting (held in Wellington, New Zealand) when a recommendation urged that this issue be placed on the agenda for the next
meeting. 66 Regrettably, while the issue was discussed in the 1975
Oslo meetings, nothing substantive resulted.
It was not until the Ninth Consultative Meeting in 1977 that the
question of resource exploration and exploitation was officially
addressed. In opening the 1977 meeting in London, Ted Rowlands
of the United Kingdom's Foreign Office posited in reference to an
Antarctica resource regime, "If we do not face up to this challenge, a vacuum will be created and that vacuum would be filled if
not by us, then by others."67 The Parties finally agreed upon a
moratorium on mineral exploration and exploitation until a
framework for these activities had been established.68 Thus, the
question of exploiting mineral resources was left in abeyance and
the Consultative Parties have turned to developing a regime oriented towards the conservation of marine living resources.
Undoubtedly, sound environmental grounds do exist for introducing firm restrictions on Antarctic krill fishing. Such restrictions, however, seem unlikely to evolve in the near future, and the
negotiations conducted thus far on a regime for the conservation
of marine living resources carry the earmarks of Ted Rowland's
philosophy. The currently proposed Convention represents an attempt to solidify the Consultative Parties' control over the
Antarctic area. Article V requires parties to the Convention to
"acknowledge the special obligations and responsibilities of the
66. Recommendation VII-6, concerned with the "Effects of Mineral Exploitation" provided in relevant partNoting the technological developments in polar mineral exploration and
the increasing interest in the possibility of there being exploitable minerals in the Antarctic Treaty Area .... Recognizing that mineral exploitation is likely to raise problems of an environmental nature and that the
Consultative Parties should assume responsibility for the protection of
the environment and the wise use of resources.
Conscious of the special situation in the Antarctic Treaty and the Recommendations adopted under it; Recommended to their Governments that
the subject "Antarctic Resources-Effect of Mineral Exploration" be carefully studied and included on the Agenda of the Eighth Consultative
Meeting.
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN A FAIRS, REPORT OF SEVENTH CONSULTATIVE

MEETING,

22

(1973).
67. Quoted in Mitchell, supra note 62, at 19.
68. See generally Report of the Ninth Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting,
Doc. ANT/IX/83 (Rev. 2) (1977). See also Mitchell, Antarctic Enlightenment, 76
NEW SCIENTisT, 130 (1977).

Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties for the protection and preservation of the environment of the treaty area," and compels
them to "observe as and where appropriate measures as have
been recommended by the Parties." Clearly, this language attempts to bind presently non-Antarctic Treaty nations to future
actions of the Consultative Parties. Furthermore, Article VII automatically makes all Consultative Parties full voting members of
the new Convention, while imposing "research or harvesting" ob69
ligations on other States before they might vote.
In addition, institutional provisions of the draft Convention appear inadequate in at least three other crucial respects. First,
they fail to provide for the acquisition of sufficient scientific data
which is needed to fulfill the regulatory commissions' mandate in
supervising the entire marine ecosystem. Second, decisions on
important conservation measures, such as setting total catch
levels and the subdivision of the area for management purposes,
would require unanimous agreement, subject to a "double" veto
by any member. Each member can veto at the time ballots are
cast, or within 90 days of that time. Third, clever legal ambiguities
concerning "coastal States" economic zone rights are found in the
text, and these conceivably could exclude a substantial portion of
the fishery from the commission's authority. "Coastal States"
consequently might apply looser standards in these zones in order to maximize their fishing return in the short run.
These nuances in the aforementioned provisions evidently represent an effort to enhance the Parties' overall jurisdictional control over Antarctica, as well as to legitimate the collective juridical
basis for that control. Acceptance of the draft Convention by the
international community would thus inferentially serve to
strengthen the prevailing national claims to the continent vis-Avis the non-Consultative Parties. Similarly, it is likely that the
Convention's wholesale acceptance by the international community would assist in insuring a legal basis for the Treaty parties to
institute a limited condominium or perhaps, some other joint
ownership arrangement over mineral resources on the continent
and offshore.
69. Article VII provides in relevant part:
(a) each Contracting Party which participated in the meeting at which
this Convention was adopted shall be a Member of the Commission;
(b) each State Party which has acceded to this Convention pursuant to
Article XXIX shall be entitled to be a Member of the Commission
during such time as that acceding party is engaged in research or
harvesting activities in relation to the marine living resources to
which this Convention applies;
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, art. VII
(2), paras. (a) and (b). Opened for signature August 1, 1980, and reprintedin 19
INT'L L. MATERLsS 841 (1980).
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From a legal standpoint, resource plans or regulations in a Convention devised by the Consultative Parties will have no binding
effect upon non-signatories. There is no legal barrier preventing a
non-TrJeaty nation, for example, from harvesting krill. Whether
the Group of 77 and other non-Treaty party nations will abide by
the provisions of a promulgated draft Convention remains a matter of conjecture. The Convention, as proposed, does little to accommodate, much less promote, the interests of developing
countries. As a result, given the scenario in which a non-Treaty
party undertakes exploitation of a particular resource in a manner that runs counter to the conservation rules set down by the
Parties, the likelihood for regional conflict would seem very great.
Towards a Viable Regime for Antarctica
At this point, the reader should be quite cognizant of the intent
of the Consultative Parties to maintain exclusive control over any
type of Antarctic regime, both present and future. Consideration
of proposed "solutions" to the problem of Antarctic jurisdiction,
including national and condominium approaches, is now in order,
although it should be stressed that these approaches are admittedly narrow in scope. That is, they intentionally fail to include
the interests and welfare of the entire international community.
The National Model
The "national approach" would grant sovereignty to those individual nations claiming historic interests in Antarctic sectors,
thereby producing a segmented Antarctica. Put tersely, this
would mean national sovereignty over each slice of the continental pie. Ostensibly, the greatest benefit of this approach would be
sound resource management that purportedly stems from individual national ownership and control. In addition, the national approach can be held as being more "equitable" in that it allows
those nations which had the early foresight and initiative to explore the Antarctic to profit from the natural wealth which their
efforts have made available. Finally, it has been argued that despite the tenuous validity of these Antarctic national claims, it is
manifest that they are the only claims that have been made and if
any national interest is extended out onto the Antarctic margin,
logically, it should be representative of the national interests of

Antarctica's present occupants.7 0
The United States Model
If the national approach eventually were adopted, the 1959
Antarctic Treaty would immediately be abrogated. The United
States has urged reinterpretation of two Treaty provisions so that
open resource exploitation would be allowed under the Treaty by
common agreement. A new Treaty would not necessarily have to
be negotiated, nor would the pervasive sovereignty issue have to
be resolved. The first component of the United States position
would have resource exploitation permitted as provided for in Article I as a "peaceful use" of Antarctica. "Peaceful use," it is held,
should be interpreted broadly to include all non-belligerent uses
7
consistent with other provisions of the Treaty. 1
In response to the contention that allowing resource exploitation under the current Treaty regime would undercut the positions of contemporary sector claimants, the United States points
to Article IV, wherein it is posited that while the Treaty is in
force, resource activities will not constitute a basis for asserting,
supporting, or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica and will not create any rights of sovereignty.7 2 This interpretation of the Treaty provisions is undoubtedly a minority view
among the Consultative Parties, and hence, the claimant States
likely will assert that the Treaty's silence on resource jurisdiction
and commercial interests was made in deference to complex preTreaty claims. Even so, the United States further argues that, owing to the absence of a recognized coastal sovereign (which is a
70. Note, Natural Resource Jurisdictionon the Antarctic Continental Margin,
11 VA. J. INT'L L. 400 (1971).

71. Lundquist, supra note 56, at 14.
72. The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 2, at art. IV, 12. Certainly, not less in importance is the first paragraph of Article IV which in essence freezes resolution of
the claims question. In full, Article IV reads thusly:.
1. Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as:
(a) a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted
rights of or claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica;
(b) a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of any basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which it may
have whether as a result of its activities or those of its nationals
in Antarctica, or otherwise;
(c) prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as regards its
recognition or nonrecognition of any other State's right or claim
or basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica.
2. No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force
shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty
in Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present
Treaty is in force.
Antarctic Treaty, supra note 2, at art. IV;
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legal prerequisite for an espoused territorial sea), the high seas
extend up to Antarctica's coastline. As a consequence, since
rights relating to the high seas are deemed extraneous to the purview of the Treaty, water column resources must lie external to
the Antarctic Treaty area. The United States contends, therefore,
that resources juxtaposed proper to the continent should be made
legally analogous to those in the high seas, with free access for
exploiting those resources guaranteed to all. Though this attitude
might appear to countenance promise for an international community regime, the reality is that fewer than a dozen nations (one
of whom is the United States) will possess the wherewithal to exploit Antarctic resources during the remainder of this century. 73
The unrestricted appropriation of Antarctica's nonrenewable resources would allow developed States to deplete at will valuable
resources before developing States could undertake any exploitation activities. Given this prospect, Antarctica's nonrenewable
reserves of petroleum, for instance, should not be equated with
fishery resources in the high seas. A better comparison is that of
manganese nodules on the deep seabed, a resource widely identified as nonrenewable, belonging to all States and peoples in common, and not available for unbridled private exploitation. To this
end, only a fully representative regime is likely to determine with
equity whether or not these nonrenewable resources should be
used, and if so, in what manner and for whose benefit.
The Condominium Model
Still a third jurisdictional model suggested for the Antarctic
would have the Treaty nations asserting sovereignty over the area
as a collective, cooperative body, in other words, a type of selective condominium. Writers such as Peter Bernhardt have intimated that the evolving Law of the Sea philosophy could provide
a significant impetus for cooperative action by the Antarctic
Treaty nations to avoid being upstaged by the international community in the Antarctic area. 74 Indeed, the possibility of outside
intervention and the desire for orderly control of commercial ex73. Mitchell, supra note 34, at 77.
74. Bernhardt, supra note 29, at 297-99. See ,also Note, Survival of the
Antarctic Treaty: Economic Self-Interest v. Enlightened International Cooperation, 2 B.C. INT'L & COmP. L.J. 115, 128-29, (1978); Rose, Antarctic Condominium:
Building a New Legal Orderfor Commercial Interests, MAnIAM TEcH. SCL J. Jan.
1976, at 19. Cf. Thaw in InternationalLaw?, supra note 23, at 843 and JESSup &
TAUBENFELD, supra note 4, at 11-49.

ploration and exploitation could induce both claimant and nonclaimant Parties to accept a joint solution. In short, the status
quo-oriented Consultative Parties may be compelled to meld together a permanent regime for Antarctica in order to stave off external efforts to designate Antarctica legally as the common
heritage of mankind.
Four principal arguments lend support to the condominium notion. In the first place, a joint sovereignty regime over the
Antarctic, in which all parties share equal rights, could entail a
final resolution to the claims question. Second, the clear recognition of sovereignty could facilitate effectuation of the legal order
necessary for encouraging commercial interests into the region.
Third, creation of a sovereign "State" in Antarctica would enable
it to be considered more legitimately as a "coastal State," thereby
enabling exercise of rights to the continental shelf under the 1958
doctrine, as well as other coastal state rights that may be established during the ongoing Law of the Sea negotiations. Finally, a
condominium regime would also legitimate delimitation of the
area, thereby permitting exclusion of an international regulatory
authority which might emanate from a United Nations Conference. The national claims of the current Consultative Parties to
offshore oil and natural gas would be preserved and solidified.
The Trusteeship Model
At this juncture, one might well wonder whether any consideration has ever been given to a proposal advocating a more equitable system of administering the Antarctic, one which would be on
the scale of total internationalization. Such a proposal was indeed made by the United States Department of State, both in late
1947 and early 1948, and it called for a trusteeship arrangement for
Antarctica under the United Nations as provided for in Articles
75, 76, 77 and 79 of the United Nations Charter.75 Several objections subsequently were raised by interested parties. For example, it was argued that the principal reason for a United Nations
trust arrangement was merely to obviate the charge that the
United Nations was being circumvented. The United Nations,
however, was also considered in its early years to be primarily a
security organization, and since strategic considerations in Antarctica at that time were thought to be negligible, there apparently was no pressing reason for placing the region under United
Nations jurisdiction. Furthermore, through Article 76 of the Char75. For a dated, but nonetheless informative account of the functions, responsibilities and operations of the United Nations Trusteeship arrangement, see generally J. MURRAY, JR., THE UNITED NATIONS TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM (1957).
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ter, the trusteeship system had been established primarily for development of the "political, economic, social, and educational
advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories," and there
76
were and are no indigenous peoples in Antarctica.
Significant also is that Philip Jessup and Howard Taubenfeld
suggested in 1959 that surrender of national claims to sovereignty
should be made to a supra-national body representing only those
States possessing claims or bona fide interests, or perhaps more
usefully for some purposes, to an international body representing
the interests of all nations and peoples. This could be an organ of
the United Nations, a body formed under the Trusteeship Council
or some new entity entirely. While it should be clear that no legal
or technical obstacles to an assumption of title to Antarctica by
the United Nations are evident today, nonetheless, it should be
plain that the idea of United Nations administration or placing the
continent under the jurisdiction of some other international body
is not a new concept and is not appealing to the Consultative Parties.

77

The Common Heritage.Model
It is a noble, if perhaps politically naive, contention that no
Party or exclusive association of Parties should exploit nonrenewable resources, create dangers to the environment, or establish
any system of exclusive control in spaces that are, or may become, of great value to mankind generally. Antarctic resources,
particularly protein rich krill, do have a role to play in the construction of a New International Economic Order,78 but they can
hardly be equitably exploited under the current Antarctic Treaty
umbrella. Thus, it would seem desirable from a utilitarian perspective that the management of the continent and its resources
should come under wider international auspicies than those provided by the Antarctic Treaty, and, indeed, decisions concerning
76. Hanessian, supra note 16, at 437.
77. JESSUP & TAUBENFRLD, supra note 4, at 180.
78. See e.g., Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, U.N. GA. Res. 3201, S-6 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1), 3, U.N. Doc. A/
9559 (1974). Some commentators have criticized the notion of a "New International Economic Order," on the grounds that since it was proclaimed in the mid1970s, the international economy has been hardly "new;" has had profound national, as well as international, facets; is not only "economic," but highly
politicized as well, and is anything but "orderly." Cf. White, A New International
Economic Order?, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 323 (1976).

the use or preservation of "common-space" regions and resources
should be made only through a process that accounts for all major
interests of the world. Prior to the commencement of activities
aimed at the exploitation of Antarctica, some kind of international
regime must be agreed upon and established.
Several factors serve to make continued dominance by the Consultative Parties both unlikely and undesirable. In the first place,
they rest on rather shaky ground in taking steps to deal with resource exploitation, particularly because the Treaty itself ignores
that question entirely and because decisions agreed upon by the
Parties are not binding upon nonsignatories. That the majority of
the international community has acquiesced to twenty years of
Treaty-power jurisdiction does not automatically grant the signatories a preemptive right to fashion exploitation policy. In addition, the existing acquiescence of the international community is
not likely to persist in the event Antarctic resources are depleted
precipitiously in sizeable quantities.
Furthermore, it is important to realize that the world political
community has been altered radically since territorial rights initially were claimed in Antarctica. Nearly one hundred new independent States have been created since World War I, and
most of them remain poor and acutely sensitive to economic and
political domination by the Western powers. These new states
represent a nascent political force that has disrupted the "closed
club" of an earlier, more exclusive international society and in the
process, have exerted a notable influence on the recent evolution
of international legal principles. Outstanding among these new
legal concepts are obligations espousing equitable sharing of
wealth and resources and rights to participate in making decisions of international concern. Both of these concepts challenge
the current alignment of power in Antarctica. There is little doubt
that claims of exclusive rights to scarce new lands and resources,
as well as other schemes by developed States to exploit new
spaces without benefit to the poor majority, will further widen the
world's income gap and threaten the vitality of the international
economic system itself.
Considerable analysis in this paper has been devoted to discussion of the management of Antarctica's resources. Developing nations are trying to secure general recognition of the need to
radically alter the existing complex of economic relationships,
and their efforts have resulted in a vigorous thrust of quasi-lawmaking for areas beyond national jurisdiction, particularly the
deep seabed and outer space. Indeed, in 1970 the U.N.'s Declaration of Principles proclaimed the seabed beyond national jurisdic-
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tion to be the "common heritage of mankind," immune from
appropriation by states or persons.7 9 The exploitation of seabed
resources is to be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a
whole, taking into particular consideration the interests and
needs of developing nations.
The struggle undertaken by the Group of 77 nations in pushing
for the creation of an International Seabed Authority (ISBA)80
could, at least theoretically, have an impact in formulating any
scheme encompassing the internationalization of Antarctica. At
this time, it is manifest that the ISBA would not have jurisdictional purview over the entire Antarctic area since both land and
ice obviously are included in that region. The proposed Authority, however, could formulate policy respective to the Antarctic
continental shelf and its adjacent seabed, since they both would
fall within the "Area" mandated to the Authority, consisting of
"the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction." This is a patent example of conflicting
interests where the Treaty Parties directly confront antagonistic
priorities in the Law of the Sea deliberations.
A case has been made that, although the present Antarctic
Treaty regime affirms Antarctica's special international status, it
nonetheless is not well suited to resolve contemporary, much less
future, issues of resource allocation and development there.
Plans promoted to develop resources by the exclusive Consultative Parties jeopardize the interests of other States in Antarctica.
Moreover, despite the fact that the Parties have assigned to themselves the task of preserving the integrity and status quo of this
region, the non-Treaty majority of States could well marshal a legal argument based upon the principle of rebus sic stantibus: that
is, a fundamental change of circumstances has occurred respective to the Antarctic, and that area is now in fact terra communis,
to be utilized for the genuine benefit of all mankind, not just the
79. Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and
the Subsoil Thereof; Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, GA. Res. 2749, 25
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971).

80. Indeed, the most recent 'Informal" document negotiated toward achieving
a multinational treaty for governing the oceans places considerable weight on the
functions, powers and duties of an International Seabed Authority. See Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (Informal Text), 10 Official Records of the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A./CONF.62/WP.10/

Rev. 3/Add. 1 (1980), at arts. 133-91.

members of the Consultative Party group. 8 '
CONCLUSION

This paper has sought to examine the complex situation underlying the contemporary legal status of Antarctica and its resources in light of the emerging law of the sea. Given the
nuances and uncertainties of the current continental regime, it
seems plausible that the contentious legal status of the Antarctic
Treaty might be more productively addressed in the aftermath of
the UNCLOS II negotiations. This would be especially true if the
proposed deep seabed mining Authority proves a viable institution, which would likely be viewed as a logical precedent for future administration of "common-space" areas such as Antarctica.
That notwithstanding, there should be little doubt that the Consultative Parties-particularly the claimant States-form a united
front designed to thwart any encroachment upon their interests
by non-Treaty States or by some newly conceived international
authority. That development would indeed be regrettable, because if an international regime for administering Antarctica is to
be created, the Consultative Parties must play a pivotal role for
any hope of its success.
More than twenty years ago, a notable British Antarctic explorer pointedly observed: "We need not fear that in making the
attempt to establish in the Antarctic the first real international
territory under some form of United Nations auspicies, [we would
be] betraying the great explorers of the past for they sought
8
nobler goals than the mere expansion of national territory." 2
Towards this ambitious end, the steps taken will be, of necessity, deliberate and slow. It is hoped that the analysis herein
presented holds promise that, in the final outcome, an acceptable
accommodation between both the Consultative Parties and nonTreaty members can be worked out. Should this be accomplished, a great stride will have been made towards the premier
goal in international law of global harmony. This is the supreme
challenge that ultimately should confront diplomats and negotiators as they grapple with the Antarctic dilemma.

81. See Burton, New Stresses on the Antarctic Treaty: Toward International
Legal Institutions Governing Antarctic Resources, 65 VA. L. REv. 421, 497-511
(1979); Cf. Alexander, supra note 60, at 417-23 and Pallone, supra note 58, at 410.
82. C.W. JENKS, THE CommoN LAw OF MANKn 367 (1958).

